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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the influence of political partisanship on antidumping 
protection, which has become the most frequently used contingent trade remedy in the last 20 
years. First, we show that the number of antidumping initiations from the labor intensive 
industries increases when there is a left-wing government in power. In addition, the evidence 
on the governments’ decision to impose antidumping duty demonstrates that the increase in 
the leftist orientation of the governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an 
affirmative antidumping outcome from the petitions of labor intensive industries. Although 
antidumping is an administrative protection which includes a set of necessary procedures and 
rules to follow, our findings clearly points out the political bias in AD actions in the form of 
partisan preferences.  
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1. Introduction 
To date, the role of political ideology in the choice of economic policy 
instruments has received serious attention. Many of the existing studies suggest that in 
a democratic regime, political parties which compete for electoral votes try to adopt 
policies in favor of their electoral base. Hence, it is the constituents’ interests which 
determine the ideological attitude of the governments. Generally, the political party 
that is in the left ideological spectrum represents workers, whereas the right-wing 
represents capital owners.3 
Trade policy is one of the policy instruments, which enables a political party to 
differentiate itself from others to compete for votes. The redistributive consequence of 
the trade policy is the pivotal argument of the political economists who 
have emphasized the partisan-based trade policy. For instance, Milner and Judkins 
(2004) investigate the relationship between “class cleavage based partisanship” and 
“trade policy” of a political party and find that left-wing parties in advanced 
industrial countries adopt more protectionist policies compared to the right-wing 
parties. Focusing on US trade policy between 1877 and 1934, Epstein and O.Halloran 
(1996) showed that Republicans raised the tariffs, while Democrats cut them. 
Rogowski (1989, pp. 98) predicts that in countries, such as United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which are capital rich, left-wing parties should 
be protectionist. By combining the political support function of Hillman (1989) with 
Stoper-Samuelson theorem, Dutt and Mitra (2005), henceforth (DM), show that left-
wing governments are protectionist in capital abundant countries, whereas they are 
                                                          
3 See Hibbs (1977), Alesina(1987), Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos (1982), Pinto and Pinto (2008) 
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pro-trade in labor abundant countries when compared to their right-
wing counterparts. Further, Krever (2008) highlights the impact 
of partisan preferences on the government’s decision to form preferential trade 
agreements. His results indicate that independent of its factor endowments, a 
country is more likely to form preferential trade agreements when there is a right-
wing government in power. 
Whether the political ideology of the governments affect the trade policy in the 
countries has been widely examined, but nothing is known about the effect of partisan 
preferences on antidumping, the most implemented non-tariff barrier over the years. 
In this paper, we exploit the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and production data to 
analyze the effect of political ideology on antidumping filings and the governments’ 
decision to impose AD duty. In this regard, this study represents the first attempt to 
integrate antidumping in a study of partisan trade policy.   
Limited to developed countries until the late 1980s, the use of AD has 
increased worldwide over the past decade especially after the sharp tariff cuts 
countries experienced with World Trade Organization’s inception in 1995. According 
to Bown (2008), more than 40 members of the World Trade Organization have 
become active users of AD. Aggarwal (2007, pp.151, 152) notes three possible 
perspectives for the rationale behind the proliferation of AD: the political perspective, 
the political economy perspective, and the economic perspective. The first two argues 
that AD is a GATT/WTO legal trade remedy used to provide protection to the domestic 
firms which is injured by the imports of their foreign competitors. On the other hand, 
the last one argues that AD is a policy which aims to prevent a situation where 
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international price discrimination drives the domestic firms out of the market. In this 
study, we build on the “political economy perspective” to antidumping and seek 
evidence as to whether the political ideology of the government has an effect on AD 
usage and our empirical results suggest such an effect. 
The theoretical perspective of our study is motivated by the earlier work of DM 
(2005). Simply put, Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that trade will increase the 
demand for the abundant factor in production and decrease for the scarce one. 
Therefore, in a capital intensive industry, it is the owners of labor who suffer, while 
capital owners gain from a shift towards protection. On the contrary, increased trade 
will benefit capital and hurt labor in labor intensive industries. DM (2005) argues 
that since importable good is the labor intensive one in a capital-rich country, an 
increase in the leftist orientation of the government increases the trade barriers in 
capital abundant countries, and an opposite scenario holds for the labor abundant 
countries. This hypothesis is strongly supported in DM (2005) with different types of 
protection tools such as tariffs, import duties and quotas.   
Following the same line of argument with DM (2005), if the left-wing 
government is in power, we would expect an increase in the likelihood of a successful 
AD case from the labor intensive industries given the fact that such a government will 
be more willing to increase the return to labor. Moreover, we hypothesize that labor 
intensive industries believe that the leftist government favors them and thus they are 
more likely to file an AD petition in the periods of left-wing governments. These two 
hypotheses are strongly supported in our empirical analysis when we employ the 
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detailed AD data matched with the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and production 
data.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
econometric approach and the specifications carried out in our analysis. In Section 3, 
we briefly discuss the construction of the data. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results, and section 5 provides the concluding remarks. 
2. Econometric Methodology  
Estimation of Antidumping Initiations 
Antidumping is defined under the Article VI of the GATT. In order to receive 
protection in the form of an AD duty, domestic firms file an investigation and show 
evidence that exporting firms charge lower than the "fair price" they normally charge 
in their home market. In addition to this, they document that the domestic industry is 
"materially injured" by this price discrimination. Thereafter, national AD agencies 
evaluate the investigations and either they impose a duty to the particular product-
country combination or they terminate the case without protection. 
In order to examine the effect of partisanship on AD activity, we start with the 
following baseline model: 
                                               (
 
 
)
   
                      
(1)                                                                                                                   
where   denotes the total number of AD petitions filed by industry h in country i. 
   ⁄     is the capital-labor ratio of the three-digit ISIC industry,            denotes 
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the degree of the government’s leftist bias which is quantified as 1 for the right-wing 
ideology, 2 for the centrist ideology and 3 for the left-wing ideology.     and     are  
vectors of control variables.4 A positive coefficient on the ideology variable and a 
negative coefficient in the interaction term would suggest that labor intensive 
industries believe that left-wing governments favor them and thus they are more 
likely to file an AD investigation given the higher expected belief they have for a 
successful outcome.  
Since the dependent variable is count data with excess zeros, we employ Zero 
Inflated Poisson (ZIP) method suggested in Lambert (1992) and Greene (2004).5 ZIP 
models the likelihood of an industry to ﬁle antidumping investigation in two stages. In 
the ﬁrst one, domestics firms will never ﬁle an antidumping investigation. For 
instance, if an industry believes that the benefit of a successful case might not be 
sufficient enough to dominate the costs associated with filing an investigation because 
of their low share in total imports; it may never choose to claim dumping. In the 
second stage, the industry may or may not ﬁle an AD investigation based on the 
industry and country related factors.6,7 
We also control for various other factors following the AD literature. For 
instance, in line with the WTO rules stated above, we include the average output and 
import growth of the industry in the last three years. The likelihood of filing an AD 
petition should increase with the fall in production and with more competition from 
                                                          
4 We use the natural logs of capital-labor ratios as in Dutt and Mitra (2005). Besides, this variable is 
lagged one period in all specifications of our empirical analysis to avoid the potential endogeneity.      
5
 The dependent variable is zero for the 80% of the total observations.  
6
 For the same argument and the application of ZIPM in antidumping literature, see Reynolds (2006). 
7
 To identify the first stage we used our industry and country controls. 
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imports. We believe that industries with higher output have more ability to file an AD 
petition due to the fact that it is easier for them to cover the fixed costs associated with 
filing and follow the necessary process of an AD investigation. Consequently, we 
control for the share of industry output in a country’s total GDP to capture the 
lobbying and the financial power of that particular industry.  
Following the argument in Francois and Niels (2006) and Knetter and Prusa 
(2003), we are more likely to find an AD petition in periods of exchange rate 
appreciation, current account deficits and economic recession. In this regard, we 
include the growth rate of GDP, exchange rate and current account balance. In 
addition, as noted in Bown (2008), 1995 inception of WTO resulted in a common set 
of rules which are binding for all members of WTO. Therefore, we included a dummy 
variable to control for the WTO membership. Finally, we also control for the 
democracy level in the countries given the fact that policy makers in democratic 
regime are more prone to pursue policies in favor of their electoral base.              
Estimation of Antidumping Outcomes 
We now turn our focus to the AD duty imposition decisions of AD authorities. 
As noted earlier, having reviewed the filings, AD authorities impose extra duties on 
the particular good in order to bring the value of the good closer to its fair value if 
there is dumping and injury to the domestic market.  
In order to quantify the effect of government’s ideology on the affirmative AD 
outcome, we carry out case-level estimation. We estimate the following linear 
probability model: 
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                                      (2)                                                                                             
where the binary dependent variable is 1 if government authorities decide 
affirmatively to a specific AD case from industry h and zero otherwise. Our hypothesis 
is that left-wing governments, which tend to increase the returns to labor, are more 
likely to decide affirmatively for AD cases of the industries that are more labor 
intensive. Therefore, the predicted signs of the ideology variable and the interaction 
term are positive and negative respectively. We also include the same set of control 
variables in equation (1). 
3. Data  
We collected the data of output, import, gross fixed capital formation, number 
of workers, number of establishments and the tariff data of 28 three-digit ISIC 
industries from World Bank Trade, Production and Protection (TPP) database (Nicita 
and Olerreaga, 2006. Following the convention, the capital stocks ( ) of industries 
are calculated from investment series by the perpetual inventory equation: 
                                                                    (13) 
where    is the gross fixed capital formation and   is the depreciation rate.8 The initial 
capital stock (  ) is computed as          , where   is the average geometric 
growth rate for the first ten years of available data. 9   
                                                          
8 The depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.06. 
9 See Caselli (2004). 
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The data on product-level AD investigations and outcomes are obtained from 
Global Antidumping Database Version 5.0 (Bown, 2009) which provides detailed 
product-level information on AD filings and outcomes. This database provides the 
date of the initiation and final decision of AD case, the target country, the final 
decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes of the products subject to filings. 
For the industry codes we used the concordances in the TPP database. 
 For the political ideology variable, we utilize the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al., 2008), which is updated annually and includes data for the 
period 1975 through 2006. This database provides qualitative information on the 
political position of the executive power for each country, in the form of leftist, 
centrist and rightist ideologies. Our continuous ideology variable, whose increase can 
be interpreted as an increase in the leftist orientation, takes on a value of 1, 2 and 3 
for the right-wing, centrist and left-wing governments respectively.10  
For the democracy index, we use Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 
Freedom House’s publication which was published in 1972 and reports the data on 
civil liberties and political rights for 193 countries. The democracy (political rights) 
index is such that more democratic countries are assigned a lower score than less 
democratic countries on a scale of 1 to 7.  We reversed the scores by subtracting each 
score from 8 so that more democratic countries take higher scores. 
The data on WTO membership comes from WTO website and the data on tariff 
of six-digit Harmonized System products are obtained from UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
                                                          
10 While we do not report in the paper, we also tried assigning a dummy variable for each ideology 
category and running the regressions with that measure in order to test for the robustness of the 
results. Our findings are insensitive to different treatment of the ideology measure.  
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database. Finally, we use the database of United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Economic Research Service for the data of exchange rate and World 
Development Indicators for the data of GDP growth and the current account.  
Table 1 and Table 2 provide the descriptive statistics and Table A1 documents 
the countries in the sample and their overall AD activity. 11,12 
4. Results  
Table 3 reports the estimates of the zero inflated Poisson model in equation (1). 
As documented, the positive coefficient of the ideology variable and the negative 
coefficient of the interaction term support the prediction that the number of AD 
investigations increases for labor intensive industries when the government’s leftist 
orientation increases. The rationale behind this finding is that such industries believe 
that left-wing governments favor them and thus their expected probability of winning 
a case is higher in the periods with leftist governments.    
In terms of control variables, we observe more AD filings from the industries 
with higher output share in accordance with the lobbying and financial power 
argument. In addition, with respect to the WTO requirements, an increase in industry 
output is associated with a decrease in the number of AD initiations, and the opposite 
result is observed with an increase in growth of the industry imports. Moreover, 
consistent with the previous studies in AD literature, appreciation of the local 
                                                          
11 The availability of the investment and labor data in TPP determines the sample of our analysis 
12 The reason why we do not include the European Union (EU) countries is that AD decisions in the 
European Union are evaluated by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission which makes it 
ambiguous to analyze which country’s ideology matters. In addition, as provided by Global AD 
database (Bown, 2009), firms from different countries jointly file in most of the AD cases of the EU. 
Furthermore, Indonesia is excluded from our sample because the ideologies of the political parties of 
Indonesia are unspecified in the DPI database.   
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currency and the periods of economic recession are associated with an increase in the 
number of AD filings.  
Moreover, increase in the democratization of the country is also associated 
with higher number of AD petitions. This can be attributed to the higher expected 
probability of wining an AD case because of better institutions in a democratic regime. 
This result might also implicate that industries in democratic countries have easier 
access to the government agencies which reduces their filing costs associated with an 
AD petition. The positive sign of the coefficient on the WTO membership shows the 
triggering effect of common set of AD rules on the industries’ AD initiations after the 
1995 inception of WTO.  
We now turn to the results of government’s decision to impose AD duty. In 
Table 4, we report the case level AD decision estimates when each observation is 
matched with its three-digit ISIC code. In line with the partisan trade policy, the 
positive estimate of the ideology variable and the negative estimate of interaction term 
demonstrate that an increase in the leftist bias of the government is associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of an affirmative outcome for the industries operating at low 
capital-labor ratio. This is also depicted in Figure 1 which shows the relationship 
between the leftist orientation of the government and the probability of a successful 
AD filing for different levels of the capital intensity of the industries. As shown, we 
have a negatively sloped line and the negative marginal effect is obtained for the 
capital-labor ratios above the critical one. (        
In terms of control variables, we find that petitions from larger industries 
which are more likely to be organized for lobbying are associated with a higher 
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probability of a successful outcome. Consistent with the WTO’s requirements, 
industries facing more competition from imports are more likely to grant AD 
protection, as well as the industries experiencing a depression in production. Finally, 
we do not find a significant effect of the macroeconomic determinants on the 
probability of observing a successful AD case.    
5. Conclusion 
After the dramatic tariff-cuts global trade experienced in the last two decades, 
countries still can find alternative ways for temporary protection. Out of these non-
methods, AD has become the most frequently used non-tariff barrier. Although an 
ideal AD case aims to hinder unfair competition in the international market, it has 
been widely argued that AD is also motivated by political economic considerations. To 
our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine one dimension of these 
political economic factors, the effect of political ideology of the governments on AD 
activity. Matching the data on three-digit ISIC industries’ production and investment 
with the detailed product level information on AD filings, we demonstrate that in the 
periods of left wing governments, an increase in the labor intensity of the industry is 
associated with an increase in the number of AD filings from that industry. In 
addition, our results confirm the effect of political ideology on the governments’ 
decision to impose AD duty. The empirical results suggest that the probability of a 
successful AD investigation increases in labor intensity of that industry when there is 
a left-wing government in power. Our results are also robust to controlling for 
country and industry fixed effects and also insensitive to controlling for several factors 
which is pointed out in the existing literature. 
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- * variable scaled down by 106 
- § Average percentage change from three years before t. 
 
 
 
Table. 1. Summary Statistics ( Industry Estimation) 
Variable Mean Max Min Standard deviation 
AD  Initiation 0.096 1 0 0.295 
Ideology 1.936 3 1 0.927 
K/L (log) 10.161 16.629 4.702 1.257 
Output share 0.936 13.228 0.001 1.331 
Output growth
§
 0.091 4.820 0.613 0.186 
Import growth
§
 0.508 180.498 0.986 5.562 
GDP growth 4.090 12.822 -11.7 3.941 
Exchange rate 0.950 69.458 0.151 6.460 
Current account
* 
24.656 40.371 -413.442 65.385 
WTO membership 0.384 1 0 0.486 
Democracy 5.576 7 2 1.292 
     
  
- * variable scaled down by 106 
- § Average percentage change from three years before t. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics ( Case level) 
 
Variable Mean Max Min Standard deviation 
AD affirmative 0.596 1 0  0.490 
Ideology 1.711 3 1 0.946 
K/L (log) 11.102 13.157 8.276 0.932 
Output share 1.598 12.357 0.022 1.590 
Output growth
§
 0.047 1.908 -0.561 0.179 
Import growth
§
 0.080 4.033 -0.507 0.270 
GDP growth 3.307 9.486 -6.854 2.989 
Exchange rate 0.092 1.638 - 0.157 6.460 
Current account
* 
-60.680 40.371 -413.442 102.243 
WTO membership 0.427 1 0 0.494 
Democracy 6.190 7 3 1.240 
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All specifications include a constant which is suppressed. Robust t 
statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3. ZERO INFLATED POISSON MODEL ESTIMATES OF 
ANTIDUMPING FILINGS 
 
Dependent variable: Number of AD filings by industry h in country i 
  Coefficient 
Estimates 
The role of ideology   
Ideologyit  2.276 
  (2.31)** 
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht  -0.201 
  (6.36)*** 
(K/L)iht  0.030 
  (3.67)*** 
Other Political determinants   
Output share of the industry  0.012 
  (5.61)*** 
Import growth of the industry  0.034 
  (5.76)*** 
Output growth of the industry  -0.094 
  (1.92)* 
WTO membership  0.094 
  (5.12)*** 
Democracy  0.075 
  (2.13)** 
Macroeconomic factors   
GDP growth  -0.044 
  (3.60)*** 
Exchange rate  -0.191 
  (5.49)*** 
Current Account  -0.000 
  (0.67) 
   
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  3234 
   
 
TABLE 4. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL ESTIMATES OF 
ANTIDUMPING DUTY IMPOSITION DECISION 
   
  
The role of ideology Coefficient Estimates 
Ideologyit 0.644 
 (3.86)*** 
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht -0.059 
 (2.12)** 
(K/L)iht 0.203 
 (1.97)* 
Political determinants  
Output share 0.026 
 (2.12)** 
Import growth 0.230 
 (3.98)*** 
Output growth  -0.262 
 (4.80)*** 
WTO membership -0.076 
 (0.65) 
Democracy 0.034 
 (0.65) 
Macroeconomic factors  
GDP growth -0.002 
 (1.32) 
Exchange rate 0.015 
 (1.89) 
Current Account 0.000 
 (0.23) 
  
  
Country fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Case fixed effects Yes 
Observations 1195 
  
                   
Notes: All specifications include a constant which is suppressed. Robust 
t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The effect of Ideology on Affirmative AD case 
 
Note: The increase in ideology can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist bias of the 
government. 
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Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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 TABLE A1. ANTIDUMPING USE OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE DATA SAMPLE 
 
 
    Country 
 
Time period 
Number of AD 
investigations 
Number of 
affirmative 
cases 
Share of 
affirmative 
cases in total 
investigations 
Year of implementation of 
AD law 
Australia   1986-2001 412         131 0.31       1906 
Canada   1986-1990 85          65 0.76       1904 
Colombia   1990-2000 33          18 0.54       1990 
India   1986-2001 261         210 0.85       1985 
Korea   1986-2001 61          38 0.62        1963 
Mexico   1986-2000 184          95 0.51       1986 
Peru   1991-1996 49          16 0.32       1991 
Turkey   1989-2000 72          50 0.69       1989 
United States   1986-2001 573         277 0.48       1916 
Subtotal  1715         900 0.52  
 Source: Global Antidumping Database, Bown (2009) and Zanardi (2004). 
 Note: The availability of investment data determines the sample size. For Colombia, Peru and Turkey the starting years are 
the year of implementation of AD law. 
